Peace Agreement Civil War

Nilsson, Desirée, „Anchoring the peace: Civil society actors in peace agreements and lasting peace,“ International Interactions, Vol. On 21 December 1994, the leaders of the NPFL, the UliMO and the remnants of the Liberian armed forces met in Accra, Ghana. Ghanaian President Rawlings chaired the meeting in his capacity as ECOWAS President. At the end of the meeting, the „new“ peace agreement dealt with three important issues: despite this great concession to Taylor, he still refused to end the war. It was for a number of reasons. Although this peace agreement moved closer to the NPFL`s central requirement to regulate political power during the transition period, it could not satisfy Taylor`s ultimate desire to lead the transitional government. For this reason, the NPFL has declared itself ready to participate in the transitional government and further undermine the peace process. This strategy was also influenced by the fact that Burkina Faso and Côte d`Ivoire, although they continue to support the NPFL, were increasingly concerned about Taylor`s persistent deficit in the peace process. Thus, the NPFL decided to appease its two great supporters by appearing reasonable – by agreeing to serve in the transitional government. At the same time, the NPFL continued to play its role as a spoiler. What is important is that the NPFL`s half-approach has made it more difficult for ECOWAS, even though the organization had the political will, to force the Taylor-led militia to end its continued practice of undermining the peace process.

It is estimated that 158 peace agreements contain provisions on the sharing of territorial power in the form of autonomy (Wise, 2018). Territorial power-sharing can prolong peace in the post-agreement phase, while the sharing of military power has no significant impact on the duration of peace (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003). Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) argue that poorly structured and incomplete military integration agreements (MI) are most often linked to failures in peace-building. On the contrary, Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty focused on three types of integrated peace agreements – security-friendly – transitional power-sharing provisions, dispute resolution and verification mechanisms, which increase the implementation of peace agreements by more than 47% (Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, 2017). However, previous studies do not understand why, how and when state fluctuation affects the implementation of civil war peace agreements. To date, scientists have overlooked a number of plausible statements to explain the implementation of civil war peace agreements, i.e. the degree of influence of leaders, the degree of rotation of leaders, the early sales effect of the leader, the composition of government and, more importantly, ideological fluctuations in the right-wing spectrum. These plausible explanations could be further investigated. Scientific interest in seeking peace agreements as a framework for ending civil wars is growing (Hampson, 1996; Walter 1997; Bell 2000; Spears 2008; Mutwol 2009).

This is because, according to Mattes and Savun (2009:737), „civil wars are more frequent, deadly and longer than intergovernmental wars and are more difficult to manage peacefully.“ Functionally, peace agreements have influenced civil wars in three respects. First, in cases such as Zimbabwe (1980), Guatemala (1992-1998), Mozambique (1992-1995) and Angola III (2002), peace agreements have brought an end to civil wars (Stedman 2001); Mutwol 2009).